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Every year has large demand and supply shifts associated with the seasons, regardless of the phase
of the business cycle.  Based on measures dating back to the 1940s, the seasonal shifts reject the hypotheses
that demand shifts affect employment outcomes significantly more in recession years than in non-recession
years, and that supply shifts matter significantly less (if at all) in the recession years.  My results are
consistent with the hypothesis that recessions are characterized by labor market distortions that are
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  During the recession of 2008-9, the federal government took a number of steps to 
help citizens and the economy, including expansion of food stamps and unemployment 
insurance, helping financially distressed homeowners refinance their mortgages, and 
offering tax credits to poor and middle class persons buying homes.  The stimulus 
potential from these and other programs is said to derive from their redistribution of 
resources to persons with a high propensity to spend, but the same programs also 
implicitly raise marginal income tax rates because eligibility for them falls with the 
potential recipient’s income.
2   
High marginal income tax rates by themselves “normally” reduce economic 
activity to some degree, rather than increase it, although there is plenty of room to debate 
the magnitude of incentive effects.  For the same reason, social safety net programs are 
not expected to increase employment in the long run.  But a number of economists 
believe that recessions are those rare instances when labor supply does not matter, and 
might even affect the aggregates in the opposite direction as usual (Eggertsson, 2010a).  
Thus, it is possible that government spending programs like unemployment insurance 
could stimulate economic activity during a recession, even while they eroded labor 
supply incentives, and even while those programs had very different effects in non-
recession years. 
  The hypothesis that, as compared to non-recession years, demand matters more 
and supply matters less for determining aggregate employment and output at the margin 
in a recession is also the intellectual basis for Keynesian models of the business cycle 
(Eggertsson, 2010b, p. 2).  Yet this hypothesis has not been the subject of much empirical 
                                                 
2 Topel and Welch (1980), Mulligan (2009).   2
testing,
3 even though it is logically possible that supply matters at the margin just as 
much during times of severe labor market distortions as it does “normally.”  The purpose 
of this paper is to examine the seasonals in the monthly U.S. data dating back to the 
1940s to attempt to measure the degree to which labor supply and demand differentially 
affect employment and unemployment during recession periods than during non-
recession periods. 
  The seasonal cycle has several analytical advantages.  As Jeffrey Miron (1996, p. 
17) explains, “The seasonal fluctuations are so large and regular that the timing of the 
peak or trough for any year is rarely affected by the phase of the business cycle in which 
that year happens to fall.”  For example, Barksy and Miron (1989, Table 2) found that 
GNP falls 8 percent more than normal from Q4 to Q1.  In a $14 trillion/year ($3.5 
trillion/quarter) economy: that’s a sudden reduction of $280 billion, which is a larger 
change than even the largest year-to-year change in government spending created by the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Congressional Budget Office, 2009, 
Table 2), and larger than other peacetime government spending shocks (Alesina and 
Ardagna, 2009; Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2010; Barro and Redlick, 2009). 
  Many economic fluctuations are not easily partitioned into “demand” or “supply,” 
but the seasonal cycle features an obvious demand change – Christmas – and an obvious 
supply change – the availability of teenagers for work during the summer.
4  Moreover, 
these two seasonal impulses (measured as percentage changes from the previous and 
subsequent seasons – more on this below) react little to the business cycle, and thus 
provide the opportunity to measure different effects between recessions and non-
recessions of a similar impulse.  Finally, the seasonal cycles have occurred many times: 
there have been 12 summers and 12 Christmas’ during U.S. recessions since 1948.  Even 
during the present recession – arguably different from many of the previous ones – 
                                                 
3 Jurajda and Tannery (2003) find that unemployment insurance affects individual behavior to about the 
same degree in depressed localities as in less depressed ones, but it is possible that individuals who remain 
unemployed as the result of unemployed insurance are replaced by other workers differently in recessions 
than in non-recession years (i.e., labor supply may shift the same in recessions and nonrecessions, but the 
aggregate employment impact is different).  A couple of papers (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2010; 
Barro and Redlick, 2009) have examined whether fiscal policy multipliers are greater during recessions, 
which are indirectly tests of whether labor demand matters more during recessions (Mulligan, 2010). 
4 See also (Miron 1996, p. 9).   3
Christmas and summer each occurred at least twice (depending on when the recession is 
deemed to have ended). 
  Previous work on the seasonal cycle has featured quarterly data, which had the 
advantage that the Bureau of Economic Analysis used to report seasonally unadjusted 
quarterly national accounts.  However, unlike the labor market series used in this paper 
for which the raw data are seasonally unadjusted, much of the national accounts are built 
from seasonally adjusted inputs, and seasonally “unadjusted” national account series 
were obtained by attempting to remove the seasonally adjustments that had been 
implicitly introduced via the ingredients.
5  More important, the supply and demand shifts 
of interest here do not coincide exactly with calendar quarters.  The seasonal labor supply 
surge is seen already in June, which is part of the second quarter, and concludes in 
September, which is at the end of the third quarter.  Obviously, Christmas is in 
December, and some of its activity spills into November, both of which are part of the 
fourth quarter, but the monthly data permit me to use October as a benchmark for 
Christmas, rather than the third quarter which would differ from the fourth not only in 
terms of Christmas demand but also in terms of summer labor supply. 
  Section I takes for granted that recessions are appropriately characterized as times 
of severe labor market malfunctions, and briefly shows that a couple of familiar theories 
predict that labor demand matters significantly more at the margin, and labor supply 
matters significantly less, during recessions than during non-recession years.  However, 
other theories of labor market distortions predict that the incidence of supply and demand 
shifts would be no different during recessions than they would be during non-recessions, 
so these incidence questions must ultimately be answered with empirical evidence. 
  Section II presents the evidence on summer seasonals.  I find that the summer 
seasonals for teen employment, teen unemployment and total employment are large and 
in the direction to be expected if labor supply had shifted significantly more than labor 
demand.  However, the seasonal cycles for recessions and non-recessions are not 
significantly different from each other. 
                                                 
5 In other words, seasonally unadjusted national accounts series are more accurately described as “twice 
adjusted,” rather than unadjusted.   4
  Section III presents the evidence on Christmas seasonals, which seem to be 
essentially the same in recession years as in non-recession years.  Section IV concludes.  
Two appendices examine seasonality in the matching framework, and present further 
evidence that the summer seasonal is dominated by supply. 
 
I.  Economic Theories of Employment Reductions Differ in Terms of the Incidence 
of Supply and Demand Shocks 
 
I.A.  The Job Shortage Model 
One partial equilibrium “job shortage” perspective on the labor market is that real 
wages rates have a floor – perhaps due to minimum wage laws, unions, or nominal 
rigidities – which is typically below the market clearing wage during non-recession 
periods, but above it during a recession.  In this view, employment is determined only by 
demand during a recession, but by the combination of supply and demand during non-
recession periods.
6  For example, a cut in marginal income tax rates during a recession 
would increase labor supply, but that would only add to the excess labor supply rather 
than adding to actual employment.  On the other hand, a labor demand shift during a 
recession would affect labor usage one-for-one without being even partially crowded out 
by higher factor rental rates. 
Admittedly, the “job shortage” view is over-simplified because wage rates are not 
the only mechanism to help clear the labor market.  Suppose, for example, that labor 
unions set a floor on wages with the objective of maximizing labor income.  There would 
be unemployment in the sense that workers would have an individual incentive, but no 
opportunity, to work more at the wage floor, but nevertheless the wage floor would adjust 
according to supply and demand conditions.  In fact, if the wage elasticity of labor 
demand were constant, the union wage markup would be a constant proportion and the 
sensitivity of employment to supply and demand parameters would be the same as it 
would be in a competitive labor market, even while the total amount of employment was 
                                                 
6 See also Barro and Grossman (1971).   5
less than the competitive level.
7  For this reason, the hypothesis that employment is less 
than optimal is quite different from the hypothesis that supply has little marginal effect on 
aggregate employment. 
 
I.B.  A Matching Framework, and a General Equilibrium Effect 
Search frictions can help explain why the supply of labor exceeds demand during 
a recession, but those frictions are still consistent with a positive effect of supply on 
actual employment, and with a partial crowding out of demand shifts via higher factor 
rental rates.  Consider, for example, the Mortensen-Pissarides matching framework in 
which the flow of new hires in the labor market is a homogeneous function M(U,V) of the 
number  U of persons looking for a job and V the number of available positions.
8    
Economists usually find that the number of new hires increases with the number of 
persons looking, holding available positions constant.  Thus, it would not be surprising if, 
say, a marginal income tax rate cut increased employment by increasing the number of 
persons looking for a job.  By the same logic, an increase in the number of available 
positions would increase employment less than one-for-one, even during a recession. 
Nevertheless, the matching-model supply effects are smaller during a recession.  
First, the ratio of searchers to available positions is high during a recession, and 
∂
2M/(∂U∂V) is expected to be positive.  Second, during a recession wages may be 
especially unable to fall to motivate the creation of new positions.  Thus, the search 
equilibrium view admits the possibility that a labor supply shift during a recession affects 
employment, but significantly less than it would outside a recession.  By the same logic, 
an increase in the number of available positions is expected to have a greater effect on 
number of new hires during a recession than outside a recession, even if both effects are 
less than one-for-one.  Appendix I derives these results, and finds that (a) the percentage 
employment effect of a given supply shock dU during a recession should (in theory) be 
about 2/3 of what it would be in a nonrecession and (b) the percentage employment effect 
of a given demand shock dV during a recession should (in theory) be about twice of what 
                                                 
7 The more general point is that costs on the supply side can matter at the margin for market outcomes, 
even when the market is not operating efficiently. 
8 To highlight the idea that wage rates might not clear the market, I follow the literature and assume that the 
number of available positions is given, rather than reacting to employment costs.   6
it would be in a nonrecession.  If real, these effects are large enough to be detected even 
with data on a few recessions. 
  Macroeconomists sometimes suggest that an increase in labor supply during a 
recession might actually reduce employment, even when real wages are flexible 
(Woodford, 2010).  In that view an increase in labor supply lowers employer costs, but 
the lower employment costs do not motivate new hiring because employers do not have 
customers to purchase the additional output (and will not attract such customers by 
cutting their output price).  At the same time, the lower wage rate affects the composition 
of demand, potentially reducing it.  In this general equilibrium view, labor demand not 
only looks less elastic during a recession, but might appear to slope the “wrong way.” 
 
I.C.  An Econometric Model to Nest the Supply and Demand Hypotheses 
  These economic hypotheses can be formally represented as a single econometric 
hypothesis.  To see this, suppose for the moment that wages adjust to clear the labor 
market, with labor demand and labor supply of the forms (1) and (2), respectively: 
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where Nt is employees per person (hereafter, “labor usage”) and wt is the real wage rate in 
month t.  Xt indicates the state of the business cycle (normalized so that is at its highest 
during recessions) at month t and at the state of the seasonal cycle (e.g., a dummy 
variable indicating the academic year).  Seasonals, the business cycles, and month-
specific shocks shift both labor supply and labor demand.  The model allows for the 
possibility that the labor supply and demand elasticities also vary over the business cycle.  
The hypotheses that labor demand is less (labor supply is more) wage elastic during a 
recession – even if they may still have the usual sign – are represented as  ( ) 0
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S X β ′ > ), respectively. 
The reduced form for the labor market system is:   7
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θ is the familiar incidence index:
9 it depends on the relative supply and demand 
elasticities and shows the degree to which the amount of labor usage is affected by supply 
or demand at the margin.  For the purposes of long run analysis, economists generally 
agree that labor demand is fairly elastic, but they ultimately disagree about the magnitude 
of the incidence parameter because estimates of the wage elasticity of aggregate labor 
supply vary from close to zero to greater than one.  If the labor supply elasticity were 
zero, the incidence index would be one – the amount of labor used would depend only on 
the position of the supply curve. 
The hypothesis of interest in this paper is not necessary whether the incidence 
index  θ is close to zero or one, but whether it varies with the business cycle.  The 
hypotheses that the labor usage effect of a labor supply shift is smaller, and the labor 
usage effect of a labor demand shift is greater, during a recession than outside a recession 
are both formally represented as θ′(X) < 0.
10  It’s as if workers were more elastically 
supplied, or less elastically demanded, during a recession.
11 
                                                 
9 Fullerton and Metcalf (2002). 
10 The reduced form for labor usage (3) is broken into three terms: a seasonal term, a business cycle term, 
and an idiosyncratic term.  Note that a common practice in time series analysis is to remove a year-
invariant proportional seasonal factor from labor usage series in order to arrive at a “seasonally adjusted” 
series for business cycle analysis.  However, under the joint hypothesis that θ′(X) ≠ 0 and that the seasonal 
differentially affects supply and demand, the seasonal adjustment factor would vary over the business 
cycle.  A previous literature Krane and Wascher (1999), Christiano and Todd (2002), and Matas-Mir and 
Osborn (2004) look at the cyclical sensitivity of seasonality, but two of the studies do not focus on the labor 
market and none of them attempt to isolate series and seasonals that are dominated by supply or demand. 
11 In the “job shortage” view, employers collectively face a more elastic supply of labor during a recession 
because employees are supplied not only from out of the labor force, but from the pool of unemployed.  
Other models (e.g., Barro and Grossman, 1971; Eggertson, 2010a) predict that aggregate labor demand is 
less elastic (in fact, completely inelastic) during a recession because employers are unable to adjust the   8
































These effects vary over the business cycle only to the degree that the season differentially 
affects supply and demand.  A seasonal that was either dominated by supply or demand – 
that is, had α
S′ - α
D′ significantly different from zero – would have log employment 
effects that varied over the business cycle to the degree that the incidence index θ(X) 
varied over the business cycle.  Recession-nonrecession comparisons of such a seasonal 
for log employment reveal whether θ′(X) is positive, negative, or zero. 
  
II.  The Summer Seasonal for Employment and Unemployment 
  I use two basic ideas to identify seasonals dominated by either labor supply or 
labor demand shifts: that the academic season significantly affects the willingness and 
availability of teenagers to work more than it affects the demand for their services, and 
that the Christmas season abruptly affects the aggregate demand for labor more than it 
affects the supply. 
  I use BLS measures (based on the Census Bureau’s household survey) of monthly 
national employment and unemployment by age group, dating back to January 1948, and 
calculate the summer seasonal as the deviation of log per capita employment or 
unemployment from the average of its May and September values, none of which are 
seasonally adjusted.
12  The business cycle is measured as a dichotomous variable 
indicating whether July of the year in question was part of a recession as defined by the 
NBER.  The recession-nonrecession comparisons of the seasonal for a labor market 
                                                                                                                                                 
price of their output.  Either way, the incidence parameter θ is expected to be closer to zero during a 
recession. 
12 Appendix I shows how the matching frameworks suggests a log specification, but results are quite 
similar if the regressions are specified in levels instead of logs.   9
outcome such as employment for a specific age group are made by regressing the time 
series for the seasonals on the time series for the recession indicator variables and a 
smooth function of calendar time. 
Table 1’s first two rows display constant terms from such regressions: that is, the 
average summer seasonal for employment and unemployment by age group for the non-
recession years (from the perspective of the benchmark year in the calendar time 
polynomial, 1980).  For the younger age groups, the gap between academic-year and 
summer is positive and economically significant for both employment and 
unemployment, which is to be expected given that so many of the younger people 
become available for work when the academic year ends.
13  For example, July log 
employment per capita for teenagers ages 16-19 exceeds the average for May and 
September by an average of 0.296 for the non-recession years and July log 
unemployment per capita exceeds the average for May and September by an average of 
0.285. 
The top row of the Table also suggests that the size of the summer seasonal shift 
likely exceeds the shifts associated with the largest postwar business cycles.  Log July 
employment per capita for persons aged 16-19 fell “only” 0.114 from 1979 to 1983, and 
“only” 0.299 from 2007 to 2010, whereas it falls 0.296 at the end of a typical summer. 
  Even without regard for recessions, the summer seasonal varies over time.  For 
example, minimum wages, activities at school, and other factors can change the 
propensity of teens to work during the school year, and therefore the fraction of teens 
whose labor supply would shift when summer begins.  These factors are considered in 
my analysis by its inclusion of a smooth function of calendar time among the independent 
variables.
14  
  Table 1’s middle rows display the estimated coefficients on the recession 
indicator variable: that is, the gaps between a summer seasonal during recession years 
and the corresponding seasonal for non-recession years.  The gaps for employment are 
typically in the direction predicted by the various theories – that is, that employment 
                                                 
13 The unemployment seasonal also confirms our expectation that the summer seasonal in labor supply 
exceeds the summer seasonal in labor demand (see also Miron, p. 9). 
14 In separate results (not shown in the Table), I have also replaced the time polynomial with the prior 
academic year average employment per capita, or just dropped the time polynomial and limited the sample 
to 1980-2009 – in both cases results were quite similar.   10
would expand less during recession summers – but are not economically significant.  For 
example, the average recession seasonal for log employment per 16-19-year-old is only 
0.0182 smaller than the average of 0.296 for non-recession years, or about 94 percent of 
the non-recession seasonal (see the second-to-last row of the table).  Recall that the 
simple job-shortage view predicts that the recession employment seasonal would be zero, 
and the matching function approach predicts that it would be about two-thirds of the non-
recession seasonal.  The gaps for unemployment are not always in the direction predicted 
by the theory, and are statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
  Figures 1 and 2 display the annual time series for the July log employment 
(unemployment, respectively) seasonal for the 16-19 age group together with fitted 
values from the regression used for the employment (unemployment) rows of Table 1’s 
third column.  Each of the figures indicates recession year observations with squares and 
non-recession year observations with circles.  The fitted values follow a smooth curve for 
the nonrecession years, and small spikes down in the recession years.
15  The employment 
data also display small down spikes in many (but not all) of the recession years, which is 
why the recession coefficient of -1.82 is statistically significant. 
However, -1.82 is small enough that the matching theory (shown in Figure 1 as 
triangles calculated as 2/3 of the predicted value for a non-recession year) and shortage 
theory (shown as diamonds in the figure) fail to fit even one of the recession observations 
better than the hypothesis that the recession and non-recession seasonals are the same.  
Every single recession economy absorbed large numbers of new teen arrivals into the 
labor market without a statistically abnormal rise in unemployment: all of the recession 
employment seasonal observations are far from zero, and all of the recession 
unemployment seasonal observations are within two standard errors of the regression 
function for non-recession years. 
 
 
                                                 
15 The recession years appear as spikes because most recessions do not include more than one consecutive 
July months, and the spikes are small because the recession coefficient of -1.82 shown in Table 1 is small 
compared to the non-recession seasonal of 29.6 (both in 100ths of log points).   11
III.  Christmas Demand in Recessions and Booms 
  I use Census Bureau measures of retail sales (from January 1967), employment 
(from January 1948), and unemployment (from January 1948).  Employment is measured 
both from the establishment survey and the household survey.  The regression 
specification is the same as above, except the dependent variable is the Christmas 
seasonal – calculated as the deviation of log per capita (retails sales, employment, 
unemployment, or labor force) in Nov and December (or December only) from the value 
that is linearly interpolated from October and January – and the business cycle indicator 
is from the perspective of December (rather than July). 
  Under the assumption that the Christmas season shifts labor demand more than it 
shifts labor supply, the simple job-shortage theory predicts that a given sized labor 
demand increase will increase employment more during a recession.  As a result, the 
labor demand increase will reduce unemployment more during a recession, and increase 
the labor force less (if at all). 
The top part of Table 2 displays the regressions’ constant terms: the average 
Christmas seasonal for retail sales, employment, unemployment, and the labor force 
(from the perspective of the benchmark year in the calendar time polynomial, 1980).  Not 
surprisingly, each of them has an economically and statistically significant seasonal.  In 
non-recession years, log aggregate December employment is 0.010 or 0.016 above its 
Oct-Jan trend on average, depending on the data source, which is a deviation only slightly 
smaller than measured in the summer.  Unlike the summer seasonal, and consistent with 
our expectation that Christmas is primarily a demand shift, Christmas unemployment is 
below trend. 
The middle part of the table displays regressions’ coefficients on the business 
cycle term: the estimated gap between the recession seasonal and the non-recession 
seasonal.  December log retail sales are slightly less above trend during recessions, 
although this tendency is of marginal economic and statistical significance.
16  W h e n  
combined with the fact that the rest of the economy is less seasonal than retail sales 
(Barksy and Miron, 1989), this suggests that the demand shift associated with Christmas 
                                                 
16 Judging from the Nov-Dec average, November retail sales may be somewhat more above trend in 
recessions.     12
is only slightly smaller, if not the same (as a proportion of economic activity before the 
season began) in recessions. 
The point estimates for employment’s seasonal recession-nonrecession gap are 
not always of the expected sign, and in all cases are statistically and economically 
insignificant.  The point estimates for unemployment’s seasonal gap have the expected 
sign for an unexpected reason.  In the first column, the point estimate for the 
unemployment seasonal is economically (although not statistically) significant: the 
recession seasonal reduces log unemployment about 29 percent more during a recession 
year than it does in other years.  With no effect of the recession on the employment 
seasonal, this apparently occurs because the labor force seasonal is less during a 
recession.  In other words, relative to non-recession years’ Christmas seasonal, a 
recession Christmas seasonal moves people at about the same rate from non-employment 
to employment, but moves more people from unemployment to out of the labor force. 
Figures 3-6 display the time series used in Table 2 together with fitted values 
from the regressions reported in the Table’s first column.  As noted above, the recession 
coefficient has the “wrong” sign (negative) in the regression for payroll employment.  
The matching theory says that the Christmas seasonal would be about twice as large 
during a recession: about 0.015 log points larger for payroll employment.  Figure 3 shows 
how only two of the twelve NBER recession year payroll employment observations lie 
above the regression function, and the largest deviation of those is less than .002 log 
points.    As shown in Figure 4, CPS employment (otherwise known as employment from 
the “household survey”) has a smaller Christmas seasonal.  A couple of the recession 
seasonals for CPS employment are above the regression function, but none of them is 
even close to twice the regression function for non-recession years. 
According to the simple job-shortage theory, Christmas labor demand would be 
satisfied from the pool of unemployed, without raising factor prices and thereby without 
expanding the labor force.  Figures 5 and 6 display the Christmas recession seasonals for 
unemployment and the labor force, showing how few recessions fit this pattern.  Roughly 
consistent with the theory, the 1953-54 recession and the 1973-75 recession had 
essentially no labor force seasonal and an unemployment seasonal that was larger than 
normal.  However, the other ten recession observations do not fit this pattern either   13
because the labor force seasonal is significant, or the unemployment seasonal is not larger 
than those from non-recession years, or both.
17  
 
IV.  Conclusions 
  I find that the summer and Christmas seasonals for employment and 
unemployment are essentially the same number of log points in recession years and non-
recession years.  When school lets out and teens storm into the labor force, even a 
recession economy creates summer jobs.  When Christmas increases labor demand, many 
of the positions are filled by expanding the labor force, even during a recession when 
there would seem to be ample unemployed to do the work.  Even the 2008 and 2009 
summers and Christmas’ looked a lot like summers and Christmas’ in nonrecession years. 
  These findings contradict the view – which is the basis for much fiscal policy and 
business cycle analysis – that labor supply shifts have little (or even perverse) effects on 
aggregate employment during a recession, and contradict the view that demand shifts 
encounter significantly fewer supply constraints during a recession than they normally 
would.  Admittedly, recessions are times when the labor market does not function well, 
but nonetheless labor supply and demand seem to operate on the margin during 
recessions in much the same way that they do during non-recession years. 
  The Christmas cycle is at least as large as the high frequency peacetime 
government spending changes that have been observed in U.S. history, so my results 
might imply that fiscal demand shocks would have much the same employment effects in 
a recession as they would in non-recession years.  Of course, the seasonal results by 
themselves do not rule out the possibility that a fiscal demand increase significantly 
increases employment regardless of whether or not it were a recession (although see 
Alesina and Ardagna, 2009 and Barro and Redlick, 2009, on this point). 
  It is possible that the labor market has different mechanisms to adapt to various 
supply and demand shifts, and that certain types of fiscal policy might be different from 
                                                 
17 One explanation of my results is that a recession can be model as α labor markets that fit the simple 
shortage model, and 1-α labor markets with no shortage, with α << 1.  In this case, labor market aggregates 
might have responses to the seasonal shifts that look like α times the shortage model and 1-α times the no-
recession-nonrecession gap model.  However, in this case it would be incorrect to claim that, from an 
aggregate point of view, supply doesn’t matter during a recession – it does in 1-α of the markets – and 
incorrect to claim that demand is dramatically more potent in recessions – it is in only α of the markets.   14
Christmas in this regard.  The seasonal cycle is also easily anticipated.
18  Either case 
raises the question of how, exactly, fiscal policy might be different from Christmas, why 
government spending might encounter fewer supply constraints than Christmas does, and 
how that information can be used to better design fiscal policy during recessions. 
 
                                                 
18 Presumably supply can better adjust to an anticipated demand shock than to an unanticipated one, and 
demand can better adjust to an anticipated supply shock than to an unanticipated one.  It’s not clear how 
this possibility relates to the interaction between the business and seasonal cycles, though.   15
V.  Appendix I: The Constant Elasticity Matching Function and the Interaction 
between Recessions and Seasonals 
 
The simple job-shortage perspective is perhaps too extreme in predicting that 
labor supply is essentially irrelevant for determining the quantity of labor used.  The 
Mortensen-Pissarides matching framework acknowledges that supply shifts would matter 
even in a recession, just to a lesser extent (than it would in a non-recession) because 
unemployment is greater in recessions and unemployment is assumed to have a positive 
but diminishing effect on new hires.  This prediction and related predictions can be 
quantified by assuming constancy for either the matching function’s unemployment 
elasticity or its vacancy elasticity.
19 
As in the main text, let N denote employment.  Employment evolves according to: 
 (,) tt t t t NM U V N δ =−   (7) 
where δ denotes the rate of job separations and t indexes calendar time.  M is the job 
match rate, which depends on the number of job vacancies V and the number of job 
searchers U.  As in the main text, let X denote the state of the business cycle, and a 
denote seasonals.  Define the steady state Nss(X) to be the level of employment that is 
consistent with constant employment, holding constant the season and the state of the 
business cycle: 
 
  ( ) () () ,() ss ss ss NX M UX VX ≡  (8) 
 
Now consider a system that is in the steady state at time t-1, and has unemployment and 
vacancies at levels Uss(X) + dU and Vss(X) + dV, respectively, over the time interval 
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 (9) 
                                                 
19 The constant elasticity matching function is common in the literature.  Anderson and Burgess (2000) use 
it when considering seasonal and other variation in unemployment and vacancies.   16
 
Define a (short-duration) supply shock to be dU > 0 and dV = 0, and a demand shock to 
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The separation terms canceled and the terms in parentheses are elasticities of the 
matching function.  If those elasticities, the openings created by Christmas (dV), and the 
job-searchers created by the conclusion of the academic year (dU) are independent of the 
business cycle, then the relative employment effects of supply (summer) and demand 
(Christmas) vary with the business cycle only because the ratio of unemployment to 
vacancies varies.  That ratio is said to be a factor of 2-4 larger in recession years than in 
non-recession years (Rampell, 2010).
20 
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Assuming that (a) the elasticities in parentheses do not vary over the business cycle and 
(b) the separation rates are no greater in a recession (δ(1) ≤ δ(1)),
21 this ratio is less than 
the ratio of unemployment per capita between non-recession years and recession years, 
which is about 0.6 – 0.8.  A similar calculation applies for examining the interaction 
between demand shock dV and the business cycle: the recession effect exceeds the non-
                                                 
20 Alternatively, one might model Christmas demand as dV/V that is constant over the business cycle, rather 
than constant dV.  In this case, the relative effects of demand and supply would vary by a factor of 1.5-2 
over the business cycle, because the number unemployed per capita varies by about that factor. 
21 JOLTS data suggest that job separation rates are somewhat less during recessions.   17
recession effect according to the ratio of non-recession vacancies to recession vacancies, 
or about 1.7. 
  The matching function is known to shift during recessions– that is, the number of 
hires during a recession is even lower than one would expect based on measured 
vacancies and unemployed.  One explanation is that the matching function really is 
stable, but that the vacancy and unemployment measures are flawed (i.e., either recession 
vacancies are over-estimated relative to non-recessions, or unemployment is over-
estimated, or both).  In this case the calculations above are in the right direction, but 
conservative in magnitude.  Another explanation is that the matching function really is 
different in a recession, but this does not necessarily affect equations (9), (10) and (11) 
because the form of the matching function matters only through its elasticity.   18
VI.  Appendix II: The Role of Supply in the Summer Seasonal 
  The importance of supply in the summer seasonal can be seen in the 
unemployment data and in comparisons between age groups.  A pure summer demand 
surge would draw teens into the labor market and result in low teen summer 
unemployment, high summer real wages, and low summer unemployment among persons 
not enrolled in school during the academic year.  Figure 7 (taken from Mulligan 2010) 
shows that, in fact, teen unemployment spikes in June as the labor market absorbs more 
than one million teens.  Unemployment of persons aged 25 and older (not shown in the 
figures) is high throughout the summer, peaking in July at almost 700,000 persons above 
trend.  Median nominal and real weekly wages for teens are often at their lowest of the 
year in the third quarter (July – September – see Mulligan 2010), and presumably hourly 
wages are even lower due to longer teen summer work weeks.  These patterns reverse 
when the academic year ends. 
The summer job surge is largest for groups with higher school employment rates.  
Figure 8 is based on enrollment data from 1980-2007 and shows how the summer 
employment spike (measured in the same way it is for Table 1) is a greater percentage for 
the younger teens, and those are exactly the age groups for whom school enrollment is 
highest.  In fact, there is essentially no employment spike for the 25-to-34 age group, and 
that group has hardly anyone in school. If summer labor demand were significantly 
higher, then summer ought to bring some extra employment for the 25-to-34 group too. 
Figure 9 displays the unemployment spikes for the same age groups.   
Unemployment per capita is greater during the summer than during the academic year, 
especially for the groups with more school enrollment.  Summer unemployment is higher 
than normal even for nonstudents, perhaps because many young people out of school 
compete in the labor market with students who exit school each summer. Table 1.  Summer Seasonals For Employment and Unemployment, by Age Group
Statistic 16-17 18-19 16-19 20-24 25-34 16+
Emp. 38.2 23.6 29.6 6.0 -1.3 2.0
Non-recession Seasonal, (0.6) (0.5) (0.5) (0.2) (0.1) (0.1)
100ths of log points Unemp. 39.0 19.0 28.5 6.7 4.4 10.2
(2.3) (1.9) (1.8) (1.1) (1.2) (0.8)
Emp. -1.90 -1.67 -1.82 -0.02 -0.05 0.02
Recession Coefficient, (1.05) (0.78) (0.75) (0.34) (0.15) (0.16)
100ths of log points Unemp. -3.57 1.31 -1.39 -2.08 1.06 -0.75
(3.80) (3.09) (2.88) (1.81) (1.94) (1.34)
Emp. 0.95 0.93 0.94 1.00 1.04 1.01
Recession Seasonal/ (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.12) (0.08)
Non-recession Seasonal Unemp. 0.91 1.07 0.95 0.69 1.24 0.93
(0.10) (0.16) (0.10) (0.26) (0.46) (0.13)
Notes: OLS standard errors in parentheses
Age Group
Each column of the Table reports results from an employment regression and an unemployment regression.  The 
dependent variable is 100 times the July deviation of log per capita employment (unemployment) from the average of 
May and September.
Independent variables are: NBER recession dummy, a 3rd order time polynomial (time 0 = 
1980) and a constant.Statistic Nov-Dec Dec only
Retail Sales 16.00 26.40
(0.59) (0.78)
Emp., Est. 1.20 1.60
Non-recession Seasonal, (0.04) (0.05)




Labor Force 0.30 0.40
(0.05) (0.07)
Retail Sales -1.32 -2.00
(0.88) (1.18)
Emp., Est. -0.08 -0.14
Recession Coefficient, (0.06) (0.08)




Labor Force -0.06 -0.09
(0.08) (0.11)
Retail Sales 0.92 0.92
(0.05) (0.04)
Emp., Est. 0.93 0.91
Recession Seasonal/ (0.05) (0.05)




Labor Force 0.79 0.79
(0.21) (0.28)
Notes: OLS standard errors in parentheses
Table 2.  Christmas Seasonals For Retail Sales, Employment, and 
Unemployment
Relative to Oct-Jan Interpolation
Independent variables are: NBER recession dummy, a 3rd order time 
polynomial (time 0 = 1980) and a constant.
Each column of the Table reports results from a retail sales regression, an establishment 
employment regression, a household employment regression, and an unemployment regression.  
The dependent variable is 100 times the deviation of log per capita (sales, employment, or 











































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig 8. Summer Employment Spikes for Groups Normally Enrolled in 
School
Summer Employment Spike















































Fig 9. Summer Unemployment Spikes for Groups Normally Enrolled in 
School
Summer Unemployment Spike
School Enrollment in October  19
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